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Abstract:
I invoke active listening and draw on models of procedural and interpersonal fairness
perceptions, perceived organizational support, and organizational prosocial behaviors to
articulate and test a model of negotiator willingness to engage in exploitative and prosocial
negotiation behaviors. Specifically, active listening is predicted to affect the other party’s
procedural and interpersonal fairness perceptions. These fairness perceptions are expected to be
interpreted as signaling the extent to which the other party cares about one’s own well-being.
Perceptions of the other party’s concern for one’s own well-being are predicted to be
reciprocated as positive or negative concern for the other party. Finally, one’s own concern for
the other party leads to exploitative and prosocial behaviors. All hypotheses except for the
proposed link between procedural fairness perceptions and perceived other party support were
supported.
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Abstract
The effects of active listening on negotiator prosocial and antisocial behaviors were
examined in an asymmetric information bargaining task. Buyers trained to engage in high
or low active listening negotiated with sellers who knew the product for sale was faulty.
Buyers engaging in high active listening engendered perceptions of procedural and
interpersonal fairness on the part of sellers. Interpersonal fairness perceptions were
interpreted as signals that the buyers cared about the sellers. Perceived other party
concern was reciprocated and expressed as increased honesty, increased prosocial
negotiation behaviors, and self-rated intent to help and descreased intent to hurt the other
party.

Keywords: negotiator deception, prosocial behaviors, antisocial behaviors, active
listening
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Negotiators are often faced with the opportunity to take advantage of the other
party, causing them harm while pursuing one’s interests. This is particularly true in
asymmetric information bargaining situations (Akerlof, 1970). Past research on these
harmful negotiation behaviors have focused on deception as the primary means of
exploiting the other party (e.g., Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Schweitzer, DeChurch, &
Gibson, 2005). The harmful behavior construct can include a variety of other behaviors
as well e.g., breach of negotiated agreements, creating ill-will towards to the other party
through gossip, and sharing private information about the other party with others.
Alternatively, negotiators could safeguard the other party’s well-being, even at
one’s own expense. Although prosocial attitudes are assumed to be important in
negotiations, I am not aware of any research directly assessing prosocial negotiation
behaviors. Problem-solving and integrative behaviors are assumed to reflect a prosocial
attitude. However, it hard to know to what extent they reflect non-instrumental concern
for the other party or instrumental concern based on a recognition that one’s own interests
are more likely to be met if the other party’s interests are at least minimally met. This
paper explores negotiators’ willingness to engage in exploitative and prosocial negotiator
behaviors.
I invoke active listening and draw on models of procedural and interpersonal
fairness perceptions, perceived organizational support, and organizational prosocial
behaviors to articulate and test a model of negotiator willingness to engage in exploitative
and prosocial negotiation behaviors. Specifically, active listening is predicted to affect
the other party’s procedural and interpersonal fairness perceptions. These fairness
perceptions are expected to be interpreted as signaling the extent to which the other party
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cares about one’s own well-being. Perceptions of the other party’s concern for one’s own
well-being are predicted to be reciprocated as positive or negative concern for the other
party. Finally, one’s own concern for the other party leads to exploitative and prosocial
behaviors. Participants engaged in a negotiation task which afforded the seller the
opportunity to deceive the potential buyer by claiming the defective product was of high
quality. Buyers were trained to engage in either high or low active listening as a
negotiation tactic. Sellers’ choice as to deceive or tell the truth, their self-rated
willingness to help and to harm the other party after the negotiation, and coded ratings of
their self-descriptions of why they made the offers they did were all used to assess
exploitative and prosocial negotiation behaviors.
Active listening is a technique for understanding the other party’s point of view
and making them feel heard, understood, recognized, and accepted as a unique individual
(Rogers & Roethlisberger, 1952; Rogers, 1959). Active listening is also espoused as an
important negotiation technique in such popular negotiation books as Getting To Yes and
Difficult Conversations (Fisher & Ury, 1983; Stone, Patton), & Heen, 1999). Although
active listening has been espoused by the books that form the backbone of the “win-win”
approach to negotiation, I am not aware of any research explicitly testing the effects of
listening in the negotiation context. Because feeling heard is one of the key components
of procedural fairness perceptions, it is plausible that active listening by one party will
affect the other party’s procedural fairness perceptions. Being treated with respect and
dignity is the core of interpersonal fairness perceptions. Therefore, active listening seems
likely to engender interpersonal fairness perceptions. Together these yield the following
hypotheses:
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H1a: Active listening by one party is associated with the other party’s procedural fairness
perceptions.
H1b: Active listening by one party is associated with the other party’s interpersonal
fairness perceptions.
The group-value model of organizational justice suggests that when decisionmaking procedures and interpersonal treatment are perceived as fair, these perceptions
are seen as signals that the other party cares about our well-being (Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Tyler & Lind, 1992). Procedural and interpersonal fairness perceptions are related to
perceived organizational support (Rhodes & Eisenberger, 2002). This leads to the
following two hypotheses:
H2a: Procedural fairness perceptions are positively related with perceived other party
support.
H2b: Interpersonal fairness perceptions are positively related with perceived other party
support.
The recriprocity principle is a powerful social psychological driver of behaviors
(Cialdini, 2008; Gouldner, 1960) and suggests that if we perceive that the other party
cares about our well-being, we are likely to respond by caring about their well-being in
return. In the organizational literature, the belief that the organization cares about one’s
well-being is called perceived organizational support (Eisenberger, Huntington,
Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986). Individuals who believe that the organization does not care
about their well-being are more likely to engage in acts that harm the organization and
less likely to engage in unrewarded acts that help the organization; Conversely,
indivduals who believe that the organization cares about their well being are more likely
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to engage in unrewarded behaviors that help the organization. (see Rhoades &
Eisenberger, 2002 for a review). If the perception that the other party cares about one’s
well-being operates similarly in the negotiation context, we can expect that perceived
other party support will elicit concern in-kind. Specifically, negotiators who believe that
the other party cares about their well-being, may want to safeguard the other party’s
welfare; negotiators who believe the other party has little regard for one’s welfare may
reciprocate by experiencing little positive and perhaps even negative concern for the
other party’s well-being.
H3: Perceived other party support is related with concern for the other party.
It seems likely that negotiators are more likely to engage in potentially harmful
deception and other exploitative behaviors when they have little concern or strongly
negative concern for the other party’s well-being. Conversely, when one cares about and
values another’s well-being, one seems unlikely to engage in potentially harmful
deception and more likely to engage in prosocial negotiation behaviors. In fact,
Moorman, Blakely, & Nihoff (1998) hypothesize but do not test the notion that
relationships between organizational prosocial behaviors and perceived organizational
support are mediated by concern for the organization. This line of reasoning suggests the
following hypotheses:
H4a: High positive concern for the other party is positively related with honesty and
negatively related with deception.
H4b: High positive concern for the other party is positively related with prosocial
negotiator behaviors.
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H4c: High positive concern for the other party is positively related with expressed intent
to help the other party.
H4d: High positive concern for the other party is negatively related with expressed intent
to harm the other party.
Although there are a number of mediating links in the chain, I expect that one
party’s active listening will be related with the other party’s honesty, prosocial
negotiation behaviors, intent to help and intent to hurt the other party.
H5a: Buyers’ active listening is related with sellers’ honesty and deception.
H5b: Buyers’ active listening is related with sellers’ expression of prosocial negotiation
behaviors..
H5a: Buyers’ active listening is related with sellers’ expressed intent to help the other
party.
H5a: Buyers’ active listening is related with sellers’ expressed intent to harm the other
party.

Method
Participants
Participants were 240 Undergraduate Organizational Behavior students in a West
Coast University, participating in a in-class exercise on ethical decision-making. Students
had the option of opting out of having their results used for research purposes. No
students requested to have their data removed from the data set.
Materials and Procedure
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Students engaged in Schweitzer and Croson’s (1999) negotiation task, involving a
one-time negotiation between strangers. The potential seller has a personal computer that
they know has a defective hard drive. Fed up with the defective hard drive and because
the computer is no longer under warranty, the potential sellers are motivated to sell it.
Potential buyers are interested in purchasing a personal computer and are told that a tech
savvy friend advised them that if a computer were a “lemon,” it would probably show
signs of problems in the first year. So, if they could find a used computer that is reliable
and had no problems during the first year of ownership, it would probably be a good
computer and could be a good deal. Participants were randomly assigned roles as
potential buyers and sellers. Buyers received training in how to engage in or avoid active
listening as a negotiation technique designed to enhance performance. Buyers were then
randomly asked to either engage in active listening or to avoid active listening as a
technique for getting a good deal from the other party.
Active listening.
Active listening training was comprised of a 45 minute training program based on
Rogers’ notions of active listening. Participants received training that either emphasized
engaging in high or low amounts of active listening, including empathy, treating the other
party with respect, engaging in reflection and expressing immediacy behaviors regardless
of whether one agrees with their positions or not.
Procedural fairness perceptions.
Procedural fairness perceptions were measured using four items identified by Colquitt
(2001). Participants were asked to rate their agreement with the following statements:
“The other party listened to what I had to say,” I was able to explain my positions and
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rationale to the other person,” “I had a lot of control over the negotiation process,” “I had
a lot of control over the negotiated outcome.” Unless otherwise notd all questions were
assessed on a seven-point Likert scale (1 – I strongly disagree, 7 – I strongly agree).
Coefficient alpha for this scale was .86.
Interpersonal fairness perceptions.
Interpersonal fairness perceptions were measured with the following five items
taken from Colquitt (2001): “The other party was polite,” The other party treated me with
respect,” “The other party treated me with dignity,” “The other party refrained from
inappropriate remarks or comments,” and “the other person treated me fairly.” Cofficient
alpha for this scale was .96.
Perceived other party support.
Perceived other party support was measured by adapting several items from
Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, and Sowa’s (1986) perceived organizational support
scale. Sample items include: “The other person cares about my outcomes,” “The other
party really cares about my well-being,” and “The other party shows very little concern
for me” (R). Coefficient alpha for this scale was .90.
Concern for the other party.
Concern for the other party was assessed by asking to what extent: “I cared about
the other party’s outcomes,” “I really cared about the other party’s well-being,” and “I
showed little concern for the other party” (R). Coefficient alpha for this scale was .91.
Honesty and deception.
Honesty and deception were measured by asking buyers what they were told by
the sellers regarding the computer’s quality and reliability. Because all sellers were told
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that the computer was unreliable and prone to hard drive failure, buyer reports that the
seller told them that the computer was defective were coded as honesty and reports that
the seller told them that the computer was reliable and of high quality were coded as
deception.
Prosocial negotiator behaviors.
Two additional measures of negotiator prosocial behaviors were obtained.
Prosocial behaviors are characterized as manifesting concern for the other party. Sellers
were asked to describe the negotiated outcome and also their explanation of why the
negotiated outcome occurred as it did. Two independent coders rated the final agreements
and seller self-reports of why the negotiated outcomes occurred as they did for the
presence or absence of expressions of concern for the other party. Descriptions in which
sellers described the negotiated outcome as reflecting positive concern for the other party
were coded as prosocial negotiation behaviors e.g., “I didn’t want them to be stuck with a
broken hard drive. That would be too awful. So, I offered to replace the hard drive
myself” and “I couldn’t do it. They were just too nice to rip off like that. So, I called off
the negotiation” are examples of statements coded as prosocial negotiation behaviors.
Intent to help other party was assessed by asking “I would be willing to help the other
party if they needed a special favor.”
Intent to harm the other party.
Intent to harm the other party was assessed by asking “I would harm the other
party if I could.”
Results
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Hypotheses one and two predicted that buyers’ active listening would affect
sellers’ procedural and interpersonal fairness perceptions. Active listening condition was
related with sellers’ procedural fairness perceptions (r=.74, p<.01) and interpersonal
fairness perceptions (r=.87, p<.01). This supports hypotheses one and two.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b were tested by regressing perceived other party support on
both procedural and interpersonal fairness perceptions. This allows us to assess each
construct’s unique relationship with perceived other party support. Interpersonal fairness
perceptions uniquely predicted perceived other party support (r=.64, p<.01) although
procedural fairness perceptions did not (r=.19, r=.11). The simple bivariate relationship
between procedural fairness perceptions and perceived other party support were the result
of shared variance with interpersonal fairness perceptions. So, hypothesis 2a was not
supported although hypothesis 2b was supported.
Concern for the other party was strongly related with perceptions of other party
support (r=.46, p<.01), supporting hypothesis 3. Concern for the other party was strongly
related with honesty (r=.72, p<.01), supporting hypothesis 4a. Concern for the other party
was also related with coded examples of prosocial negotiation behaviors (r=.39, p<.01),
self-rated willingness to help the other party (r=.53, p<.01) and negatively related with
self-rated willingness to harm the other party (r=-.31, p<.01) supporting hypotheses 4b,
4c, and 4d.
Finally, buyers’ condition (engaging in high or low active listening) was
related with sellers’ honesty and deception (r=.37, p<.01), coded prosocial negotiation
behavior (r=.41, p<.01), self-expressed intent to help the other party (r=.47, p<.01) and
intent to hurt the other party (r=-.40, p<.01), supporting hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d.
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Discussion
This study increases our understanding of active listening in negotiations as well
as prosocial and antisocial behaviors. First, this study revealed that one can elicit honesty
or deception from others through one’s behavior. Specifically, engaging in active
listening led to a significant increase in honesty from one’s negotiator partners.
Negotiators attempting to engage in active listening were more than four times more
likely to be met with honesty than negotiators engaging in inactive listening, a hard
bargaining approach. Furthermore, engaging in active listening increased the other
party’s prosocial negotiation behaviors and their intent to help and harm the party in the
future. Second, this paper explores the exploitative and prosocial negotiator behavior
constructs. Future research should widen the scope of exploitative negotiation behaviors
to include other types of harm beyond exploitative deception. Negotiators might breach
agreements, reduce their efforts or in other ways harm the other party. Future research
should also explore prosocial negotiator behaviors. One area ripe for future research is to
identify what types of behaviors real-world negotiators use to help or harm other parties.
Third, this paper suggests the usefulness of increasing the use of procedural and
interpersonal fairness constructs in negotiation domains. There are only a handful of
studies using procedural or interpersonal fairness in negotiation contexts. Fourth,
perceived other party support is identified as a useful negotiation construct. Finally, this
study also integrates the active listening technique with the justice and negotiation
literatures. Active listening seems like it should be an integral part of the justice literature
as a means of inducing procedural and interpersonal fairness perceptions. The book
Getting to yes suggested active listening as a powerful tool to transform negotiations into
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more collaborative enterprises. Although Getting to yes has fostered a lot of research
(Thompson & Leonardelli, 2004), and in spite of the face validity of its usefulness, active
listening has not received any research attention in negotiations.
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